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188 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
THE IDEAL LEGAL ORDER FOR AN OCCUPIED NATION:
POLISH COMMENTARY ON MITCHELL FRANKLIN*
JOHN J. CZYZAKt
I.
During his service in the Armed Forces of the United States,
Professor Mitchell Franklin wrote his now famous essay dealing
with the subject of the legal system of Occupied Germany.' The
work appears to have received the attention of the bar of Poland,
and was paraphrased by Ig. Andrejew, in an issue of a Polish
legal periodical2 devoted entirely to the problem of re-estab-
lishing the rule of law in Germany. Because of the continuing
crisis in world politics, it seems worthwhile to examine once
more the pattern of practices indulged in by German National
Socialism.
II.
In order to facilitate the reading of the translation and to
furnish a background for Andrejew's remarks on the Franklin
thesis, the following clarifying statements are submitted:
In civil law, including German law, the primary and predom-
inant source of law is the code.3 It represents the civilian
method of thought which aims at systematization, and consists
of provisions most of which state precepts or norms of vary-
ing generality; the degree of generality depends upon whether
they can be identified as rules, concepts, principles or standards.4
* W. R. Irby Professor of Law, Tulane University.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University.1. FRANKLIN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF OCCUriuD GERMANY, INTEEPR TA-
TIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIEs 262-282 (Sayre ed. 1947).
2. PANSTWO I PRAWO (January 1949) 100-102.
3. Whenever the word "code" is used, it shall also mean othei legislative
enactments.
4. Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 641, 645(1923). He says: "... . legal precepts are not all of one kind. For example:
In our law a promise made by one person to another is not enforceable un-
less put in the prescribed form of a sealed instrument or made in exchange
for some promise or other act which the law pronounces "consideration."
That is, the law attaches definite legal consequences to the definite detailed
facts of promise in a writing sealed, signed, and delivered, or of a promise
in exchange for a promise or other act to which the promisor therein was
not theretofore bound. This type of legal precept may be called a rule or a
rule of law. Again, as a general proposition in modern law, there is no
legal liability to repair a loss suffered by another unless the person held
liable has been at fault. Here no definite detailed legal result is attached
to a definite detailed state of facts. Instead the legal system lays down a
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The civilian method would therefore appear to be deductive
rather than inductive, the reasoning proceeding from general
premises to specific instances.
For a long time the code was viewed as a self-sufficient whole
which, because of the generality of its text, contained its own
method of development. As a result the judge, charged with the
duty of administering the law and working within the frame-
work of the code, has acquired considerable freedom of action.
Thus, as the exigencies demand it, a particular text of the code
may be extended in its meaning, or restricted. In the absence
of a controlling text recourse is had to the device of "analogy,"
a method of interpretation derived from Roman law. If, for
example, a case cannot be decided either according to the literal
text or plain meaning, reference is made to provisions con-
cerning similar cases. It should be noted of this method of inter-
pretation that it is valid only if the omission is accidental, but
it may have been deliberate on the part of the law maker. The
omission is accidental if at the time a particular situation of
fact was not envisaged by the legislator, although it now requires
regulation, and it is deliberate if such fact-situation was known
to him. Obviously in the latter case the legislator had no inten-
sweeping generalization as an authoritative premise for judicial andjuristic reasoning where rules of law are wanting or inapplicable or incon-
venient. This type of legal precept may be called a principle. Again, at
common law a bailment is a delivery of a chattel to some person for some
special purpose which defines the duties of the parties with respect thereto.
Here there is much more than a single definite legal result or a set of defi-
nite results attaching to a narrowly defined set of facts. A generalized type
of situation of fact is defined and established. Particular states of fact are
to be refered to this type. If they come within the defined limits, a series
of rules or even of standards become applicable. If the facts of a given
controversy do not come wholly within the limits of the established type,
a basis is afforded for deducing a rule from its logical presuppositions.
In such cases the legal precept is dependent upon a legal conception. Again,
one who is engaged in a course of conduct is bound to act with due care
under the circumstances of his acting, and must make reparation for any
damage that results from his failure to adhere to that standard. But no
definite, detailed set of facts will inevitably entail such liability. Within
certain limits the trier of fact must determine with reference to the circum-
stances surrounding each action whether that particular bit of action was
carried on with "due care." And he is to do so not from any legal knowl-
edge, but from his sense of what is fair and reasonable, derived from his
experience of the conduct and the opinions of ordinary prudent men in the
community. In such cases the legal precept in its application is dependent
upon a legal standard. Thus it will be seen that the legal precept itself
is not a simple institution."
The general clause in the civil code is essentially equivalent to Pound's
standard.
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tion of regulating the fact-situation; accordingly the argumen-
turn a contrario rule applies, i.e. in such a situation the analogical
method is foreclosed.
The principle of analogy was not employed in criminal law.
However, National Socialism introduced it in Germany under
the law of June 28, 1935, which read:
Any person who commits an act which the law declares to
be punishable, or which is deserving of penalty according
to the fundamental conceptions of penal law and healthy
popular sentiment, shall be punished. If there is no penal
law directly covering an act it shall be punished under the
law of which the fundamental conception applies most
nearly to the said act.5 (Italics supplied).
If neither the texts of the code nor their projection by use of
analogy yields a solution, recourse is had to sources provided for
in the code. In such event, the French Code, for example,
authorizes the judge to consider such subsidiary sources as
natural equity, Roman law, customs, customs of the place, and so
on.' The Austrian Code requires the judge to decide cases ac-
cording to the principles of natural justice.7 Similar formula-
tions can also be found in the German Code. 8
It must now be conceded that the code is not legally self-
sufficient. The Swiss Code openly acknowledges that fact in
5. Campbell, Fascism and Legality, 62 L. Q. REv. 141, 149-150 (1946).
Cf. art. 16 of the Soviet Criminal Code of 1926.
Professor Campbell notes one English case which he suggests in effect
created one new common law crime and the possibility of others by holding
that any conduct "tending to public mischief" might be indictable. R. V.
Manley [1933] 1 K. B. 529.
6. See Articles 565, 593, 663, 671, 674, 1159, 1648, 1736, 1745, 1754 and
1777 of the French Civil Code.
7. Sec. 7 of the Austrian Code reads as follows: "Where a case cannot be
decided either according to the literal text or the plain meaning of a
statute, regard shall be had to the statutory provisions concerning similar
cases and to the principles which underlie other laws regarding similar
matters. If the case is still doubtful, it shall be decided according to the
principles of natural justice, after careful research and consideration of
all the individual circumstances." (Italics mine.) This translation of the
Austrian Code appears in LENHOFF, COMIENTS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION (1949) at p. 599.
8. The German Civil Code abounds in "general clauses." For example,
to name a few, §138 thereof provides: "A jural act which is contra bonos
mores is void . . ."; § 826 reads: "One who intentionally injures another in
a manner violating the moral precepts, is liable to the other for the damages
resulting from such injury"; or § 242 which directs that obligations of any
kind are to be performed in such manner as good faith requires with due
regard to the custom of the trade. (Translations are by Prof. Rudolf B.
Schlesinger and appear in his COMrPARATiVE LAW CASES AND MATERIALS[1950].
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Article 1 thereof when it requires the judge to decide cases not
covered by the text of the code upon the basis of customary law,
or where no such rule exists, in accordance with the rule which
he would have established as a legislator."
The foregoing would seem to point to the conclusion that in
civil law countries absence of a codal or other legislative rule will
not prevent the court from deciding a case. As a matter of fact,
the French Civil Code expressly forbids judges to refuse to
decide a case upon the ground that the text is silent or insuffici-
ent with respect to the situation before the court.0 On the other
hand decision is not the source of law." This is certainly con-
sistent with the idea that general rules are stated in the code
and cannot be evolved out of cases, which is another way of
saying that a particular cannot produce a universal. If the effect
of this is to prevent extension of the rule to other cases, it fol-
lows that judicial precedent cannot play a very important role
in civil law, and it does not, in spite of protestations. 2
The notion that the code was sufficient unto itself carried with
it another notion that the code was the source of all law and that
as formulated in the code the law consisted of abstract concep-
tions devoid of any social content.1" The emphasis was on con-
9. Art. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code reads as follows: "The Civil Code
applies to all cases as to which it contains provisions either according to its
letter or its spirit. In default of an applicable provision, the judge shall
decide according to customary law, and in default of a custom, according
to such rules as he would enact if he were the legislator. He may inspire his
decision by solutions sanctioned by doctrine and by the course of judicial
decision."
This translation appears in LENHOFF, op. cit. supra note 7, at 600.
10. Art. 4 of the French Civil Code provides: "Judges who refuse to
decide a case on the pretext that the law is silent, obscure, or does not
cover the case, are liable to be prosecuted for a denial of justice." See
WRIGHT, Tn FRENCH CIVIL CODE 4 (1908).
11. For example according to art. 5 of the French Civil Code "Judges
are forbidden, when giving judgment in the cases which are brought before
them, to lay down general rules of conduct or decide a case by holding it
was governed by a previous decision." See WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 4.
12. See Deak, The Place of the "Case" in the Common and the Civil Law,
8 TULANE L. REv. 337 (1934), supporting the position that cases are at
least as good as other sources, and Ireland, The Use of Decisions by United
States Students of Civil Law, 8 TULANE L. REV. 358 (1934) taking the
opposite view.
However, an established course of decisions permits drawing the infer-
ence of the existence of a custom. The expression "jurisprudence constante"
is used in French law to explain the extent to which authority of decisions
may be carried.
13. See SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAw 263, 273, 290
(1840).
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ceptualism as though words standing alone and in the abstract
could regulate human behavior. Since the code was deemed to be
the one and only frame of reference, all that was necessary was
to select the applicable text of the code, the abstract conception,
for a major premise under which a factual situation would be
subsumed, resulting in a conclusion which could not be im-
peached for syllogistic inaccuracy. Pound, among others, gave
the lie to this formalistic approach to social phenomena when he
explained that law has at least three basic and different aspects.14
His idea of law included legal precepts,5 in civil law system the
texts of the code. This would be the place where the legal con-
ceptualists would stop. They would certainly not go beyond his
second element which according to Pound consists of method,
that is, "a body of traditional ideas as to how legal precepts
should be interpreted and applied and causes decided." 1 But to
Pound law is also
14. Pound, supra note 4, at 645-6.
15. Id. at 645. These abstract technical legal concepts are frequently
referred to as "norms" and are regarded as rules for the orderly behavior
of people in a human community.
16. Id. at 646. Pound records the following examples:
e ut... In our legal system we have a good example in the doctrine 
as to the
rce of judicial decisions as affecting judicial decision of subsequent cases.
It is almost impossible for the common-law lawyer and the civilian to under-
stand each other in this connection. In fact our practice and the practice
of the Roman-law world are not so far apart as legal theory makes them
seem to be. We by no means attach as much force to a single decision as
we purport to do in theory. Even the House of Lords, which purports never
to overrule its decisions, on occasion deals with them so astutely as to
deprive them of practical efficacy as a form of law. On the other hand,
in Continental Europe a judicial decision tends to become the starting
point of a settled course of decision, which in some countries is recognized
as customary law having the force of a form of law, and in other countries
is acquiring that effect in practice. But if the results are coming in their
broader features to be much alike, the modes of thought are wholly unlike,
and these modes of thought have decisive effect upon the administration ofjustice.
Another example may be seen in the attitude of legal systems toward
specific and substituted redress. With us, substituted redress is the normal
type; specific redress is exceptional and reserved for cases for which the
former is not adequate. To the civilian, specific redress is the n1ormal type;
substituted redress is to be used only in cases in which specific redress is
not practicable or would operate inequitably. Again, to us these two types
of remedy are so distinct that we think of them commonly as calling for
distinct types of proceeding. But the civilian conceives of the proceeding in
terms of the right asserted, not of the remedy sought, and so thinks only of
what is the practical means of giving effect to that right. In other words,
we think procedurally in terms of the remedy; the civilian thinks in terms
of the asserted right.
A third example may be seen in the difference between civil-law and
common-law thinking as to statutes. According to the orthodox view of our
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A body of philosophical, political, and ethical ideas as to the
end of law, and as to what legal precepts should be in view
thereof, held consciously or subconsciously, with reference
to which legal precepts and traditional ideas of application
and decision and the traditional technique are continually
reshaped and given new content or new application."r
law a statute is something exceptional, something introduced into the gen-
eral body of the common law without any necessary or systematic relation
thereto, in order to meet some special situation, and hence governing that
situation only. With us a statute, unless declaratory of the common law,
gives only a rule. Hence statutes in derogation of the common law are to
be construed strictly. Hence Lord Campbell's Act is applied as if it were
something anomalous and exceptional, although it is as universal in
common-law jurisdictions as any legal institution can be. With the civilians,
on the other hand, a statute is regarded as an expression of a principle, to
go into the body of the law along with other legal precepts which also ex-
press principles. Hence the civilian reasons by analogy from a statutory
provision the same as from any other legal rule. Thus it is as easy for him
to administer justice by a code as it is difficult-I had almost said impos-
sible-for us. To him a series of code sections involves the same problems
that a series of decisions involves for us. He fails to understand how
we can treat the latter as giving a series of legal rules. We fail to see how
he can administer justice by means of the former in the multitude of cases
that do not come within the four corners of the text."
17. Id. at 651. Pound says concerning this element of law:
"Turning now to the third element that goes to make up what we call
'the law,' we may find an example in the criterion of applicability to Amer-
ican political and social conditions by which our courts judged English
legal rules and institutions and doctrines in the formative period of Amer-
ican law in order to determine whether they were received as common law in
the new world, and, in case they were not 'applicable' and were not received,
to determine what should obtain in their place. Other examples may be
seen in the conception of conformity to 'the nature of free government' or to
'the nature of American institutions,' by which courts tried novel legisla-
tion and new means of securing newly pressing interests in the nineteenth
century, and in the idea of liberty as a maximum of abstract individual free
self-assertion by which decisions as to due process of law have been gov-
erned within a decade. How was the applicability of English legal precepts
to American conditions to be determined? There were no rules defining it.
That English legal precepts were in force with us so far as they were ap-
plicable, and only so far as applicable, was not a principle with any such
historically-given definiteness of content as the principle that harm inten-
tionally caused is actionable unless justified, through which courts and
jurists have been writing a new chapter in our law of torts in the last
generation. Nor was there any traditional technique of receiving the law
of one country as the law of another which the courts could lay hold of and
utilize in the making of American law. In fact they determined what was
applicable and what was not applicable to America by reference to an ideal-
ized picture of pioneer, rural, agricultural America of the fore part of the
nineteenth century, and this picture became part of the law.
Again, when our courts were called upon to perform the novel task of
interpreting written constitutions and judging of legislative acts with ref-
erence to constitutional texts-something which they could not but feel was
distinct in kind from the interpretation of statutes-they had no traditional
technique at hand. The earlier cases in which judicial power over unconsti-
tutional legislation was established were cases of attempted exercise of
legislative power in contravention of express precepts. But presently the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss2/3
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It is this last element which is most important and which gives
meaning to the abstract formulations of the first by locating
them in the total social process. As so explained, the third ele-
ment of law pertains "to the received or accepted ideals as to the
'spirit' of constitutional texts or the 'spirit' of constitutions began to be
invoked, and it became necessary to give a content to abstract constitu-
tional formulas exactly as the civilian has had to give a content for modern
purposes to abstract oracular texts of the Roman books. Our traditional art
of deciding had not been devised for such problems. Except for Coke's
exposition of Magna Carta and of the legislation of Edward I, there had
been little to do in the way of building a system of legal precepts upon a
foundation of authoritative texts. Moreover Coke's Second Institute was
in great part a political tract in the contest of the common-law lawyers with
the Stuarts. The influence of Coke's exposition of Magna Carta uponjudicial application of our bills of rights is obvious. The most significant
legal provisions of the bills of rights were taken from the Second Institute
and represent an attempt to give to the natural rights of men a concrete
content of the immemorial common-law rights of Englishmen, as set forth
by Coke and Blackstone. Yet this historico-philosophical content, derived
from seventeenth-century England and eighteenth-century France, could not
be used, as it came to us, for a measure of American legislative power.
Hence the courts fell back upon an idea of 'the nature of free government'
or the 'nature of American government' or the 'nature of American insti-
tutions'--an idealized picture of the legal and political institutions of
pioneer America.
Sometimes a caricature will bring out significant features more truly
than a photograph. In 1863 the Supreme Court of Georgia had before it
a case involving the constitutionality of a Confederate conscription statute
with reference to the Confederate constitution. In deciding this question
the court assumed the political doctrine of States' Rights as something
fundamental, to which all legislation must needs conform, irrespective of
constitutional texts. It was something running back of all texts which texts
at most could but recognize and declare. A picture of the polity for which
Southern statesmen had been contending in the bitter sectional political
contests of the immediate past, put in terms of conformity to the nature
of free government, was the basis of the court's reasoning, and it was
assumed that this picture stood for the spirit of the constitution, and
obviated all need of searching for any special text. Compare with this the
reasoning of the judges of the Court of Appeals in People v. Coler. In
that case the judicial discussion on a question of due process of law, as
applicable to social legislation for twentieth-century metropolitan New
York, begins with the proposition that the state governs best that governs
least. A picture of a pioneer, rural, agricultural society, needing little
social control and nothing of what we have come to call social legislation,
was a controlling factor in the result.
Again, when in the last quarter of the nineteenth century our courts
were called upon with increasing frequency to pass on the validity of social
legislation, in the transition from pioneer, rural, agricultural America to
the urban, industrial America of today, they turned to an idealized picture
of the economic order with which they were familiar, the principles of
which had been set forth by the classical political economists. They pic-
tured an ideal society in which there was a maximum of abstract individual
self-assertion. This was 'liberty' as secured in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hence all limitation upon abstract, free self-assertion, all derogation from
a maximum of free self-assertion, was presumably arbitrary. Such legis-
lation sought vainly to turn back the current of legal progress in its steady
flow from status to contract, and hence was not due process of law. With
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aims or purposes of the legal order."18 Stripped of the third ele-
ment, law, codal law in the civil law system, is only the undiffer-
entiated source of law, an automatic, abstract, syntactical system
complete in its reference, logical within its framework, but
devoid of meaning until differentiated and identified with the
social phenomenon. The judge cannot satisfactorily deal with
the needs of life by mere logical construction.
Now, according to Franklin, it is the third element of Pound's
definition of law that was so important to National Socialist
legal theory.9 For if the code-Franklin refers to Weimar
legislation-is nothing but an undifferentiated source of law,
a mere conceptualistic referent, all principles formulated therein
can be given National Socialist content, even though it originated
in an entirely different milieu. This was actually done within
the framework of the code, as the broad generalities of the texts
made it possible to locate it in a political context exclusively
totalitarian. The abstract was filled with the particular, in
accordance with National Socialist theory. In applying the law
the judge considered not the words contained in the code, but the
purpose that justified the law, which then resulted in placing
an over-emphasis on the dominant philosophy-Pound's third
element in or aspect of the law-and a corresponding de-empha-
sis of the first and the second.
such a picture of the social order and the end of law before it as the basis
of its conclusion, more than one court declaimed against legislation for-
bidding the payment of wages in orders on a company store as subversive
of the abstract liberty of the workman, reducing him to the position of the
infant, the lunatic, and the felon, and abritrarily setting up a status of
laborer in a world which had moved to a regime of contract.
To take an example that is no longer controversial, note how such pic-
tures of the social and political order and reference of legal questions
thereto, dictated the divergent conclusions of the judges in the Dred Scott
case. For we deceive ourselves grossly when we devise theories of law or
theories of judicial decisions that exclude such things from 'the law.' When
such ideal pictures have acquired a certain fixity in the judicial and pro-
fessional tradition they are part of 'the law' quite as much as legal pre-
cepts. Indeed, they give the latter their living content and in all difficult
cases are the ultimate basis of choosing, shaping, and applying legal mate-
rials in the decision of controversies. When we seek to exclude them from
our formal conception of law we not only attempt to exclude phenomena
of the highest significance for the understanding of the actual functioning
of judicial justice, but, as things are, we do the courts much wrong by
laying them open to the charge of deciding lawlessly when they do what
they must do, and what courts have always been compelled to do, in admin-
istering justice according to law."
18. FRANKLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 266.
19. Ibid.
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This permitted an interpretation of the law in accordance
with the National Socialist Weltanschauung. Franklin says:
National Socialist legal theory represents... a distortion
of relations. One vocation of National Socialism was the
destruction of the Weimar legal system. Consequently
certain Weimar legislation was obliterated. Nonetheless,
anti-Romanist German fascism was forced very reluctantly
to retain certain Weimar legislation, such as the great Ger-
man codes 20 and yet seek to overcome those texts. In order
to subordinate this legislation to fascism, National Socialist
jurists distorted the relations among the various elements
of law.2'
As the hated Weimar texts represented the normative or
precept elements of law, they were overcome by exaggerat-
ing the other elements in law.22 . . . National Socialism
employed its ideas as to the aims and purposes of law to
distort the historic texts of the civil code of 1900, and thus
to make it an instrument of National Socialist policy.23
In this National Socialism was aided by the professional and
philosophic elements of German society.
Franklin asserts that there is little doubt that the German bar
actively supported National Socialism. His position can be docu-
mented. As early as 1933, well-known legal theorists condoned
the excesses by which German totalitarianism has been identi-
fied. It is sufficient to name such persons as Carl Schmitt,
Larenz, Gerber, Binder, among others. 24 Heck, who together
with Dean Rumelin, founded the school of sociological jurispru-
dence, declared that henceforth judges would be guided by
proclamations of the Fuhrer in filling gaps in the law.2 5 This
peculiar adherence of legal scholars to a movement that did not
conceal its intentions of rejecting and destroying the law is to
be explained by the fact that German jurists and theorists had
been conditioned to a sympathetic reception of National Social-
ism by the nineteenth century German philosophical movement.
From the beginning of the nineteenth century German legal
thought championed the supremacy of the state and defined law
20. The reference is not only to the civil code, but the commercial code,
penal code and the procedural codes, as well.
21. FRANKLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 266.
22. Ibid.
23. Id. at 267.
24. See FRIEDmANN, LEGAL THmoY c. 21 (2d ed. 1949).
25. See Bourthoumieux, Prawnicy Niemieccy Wobec Hitlerizmu, PAN-
STwo i PRAWo (January 1949) 84.
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as the will of the state. Besides this concept of the State there
developed at the same time the concept of the people, the Volk,
which Savigny, a powerful influence in Germany during the first
half of the nineteenth century, initially articulated and which
was thenceforward developed by the so-called Historical School.
Savigny denied the right of the legislator to formulate the law,
which he envisaged as the reflection of the spirit of the people,
the Volksgeist, and claimed that only jurists and historians could
properly define and describe the same.26 Thus arose the notion
that "the ultimate basis and justification for the validity of any
law should be found in its concordance with the spirit of the
People whose law it is.''27 It is necessary to emphasize the impor-
tance of this movement as a social and political phenomenon,
particularly as it attempted to fill in gaps in the codal law.
The passion for the abstract reflects a German habit of re-
solving concrete problems by intellectualization. This passion
finds its principle in the idealism of Hegel, whose opposition to
materialism was the guiding spirit of the National Socialist
movement.
The linking of this idealism with the principle of leadership
was clearly expressed after the First World War in the writings
of Binder.28 Binder asserts that only the Fuhrer is capable of
expressing objectively the collective idea and justifies National
Socialism by granting the individual reality only in so far as
he acts and thinks the universal. 29 It is, therefore, not difficult
to imagine the response of the Germans to such pressure. Under-
standably they saw in the theory the mystical Volksgeist. The
cardinal sin which the German jurists committed was that from
beginning to the end of National Socialist dictatorship, they
constantly supported it.
They supported it when in 1933 Hitler demanded and was
given dictatorial powers. Carl Schmitt immediately explained
that the Fuhrer personified the people, that the state, the people
and National Socialism converged in the person of the Fuhrer.
From that moment on the written text was only an imperfect
guaranty in relation to that kind of will, which could neither be
26. FRIEDMANN, op. cit. supra note 24 at 127-131.
27. Campbell, supra note 5, at 145.
28. BINDER, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (1925); BINDER, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE(1935-1937).
29. As summarized in FRIEDMANN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 104-105.
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evaded nor avoided. Backed by such an attitude, Hitler was able
to suppress any kind of authority. Although he maintained
that he respected the Weimar constitution, he never intended to
abide by the Weimar institutions. As a matter of fact, shortly
after Hitler took oath in Potsdam, Carl Schmitt cried out, "The
Weimar Constitution is dead, long live the Potsdam Constitu-
tion !,,3o Of course the Potsdam Constitution was never written.
How the living law was substituted for the written texts is
clearly shown in the following words of Heydrich, the Gestapo
chief:
I have from the beginning taken the view that it is a
matter of complete indifference to me whether any para-
graph of law is in opposition to our work. For the fulfillment
of my task I do fundamentally that for which I can answer
to my conscience in my work for the Fuhrer and Nation.
I am completely indifferent whether others gabble about
breaking the law.31
In a comment to the Police Code, the police were instructed
to seek guidance from specified authorities, but the first and
foremost of the latter were the text of Mein Kampf and the
proclamations of Hitler.2
The Reichstag was retained. However, it was an assembly in
name only, and played no creative role in the making of laws,
since they emanated from the Fuhrer and could not be formal-
ized. The decrees could even be kept secret from the people, and
communicated only to those officials who were to apply them.
Thus the pronouncements in 1939 calling for euthanasia were
known only to the doctors engaged in this practice.33
Although the criminal code and the code of criminal procedure
were still in existence they served merely as books of abstract
definitions.3 4
The 1935 law already referred to empowered the judges to
apply analogically any provision of the code in the absence of law
directly covering an act, if it was believed that healthy popular
sentiment demanded it.5 According to the commentators the
conscience of the people (Volk) was expressed in the words of
30. Bourthoumieux, supra note 25, at 86.
31. Campbell, supra note 5, at 147.
32. Ibid.
33. Bourthoumieux, supra note 25, at 86.
34. Ibid.
35. Campbell, supra note 5, at 149.
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the Fuhrer, and the judges as emissaries of the Fuhrer were
to be able to get along without recourse to other law, since the
will of the Fuhrer was the source of all law.3 6
It is in this context that Franklin proposed his thesis of
intellectually controlling the German jurists. He stated that:
the task of occupation will not be fulfilled merely by intro-
ducing the military legislation of the occupants and by sus-
pending National Socialist legislation, thus restoring to full
vigor the legal texts of Weimar Germany, subject to admin-
istration by German jurists, many of them National Social-




The problem of the future legal order of Occupied Germany
concerned American lawyers even during the war. It was
realized that it would be necessary to counter National Social-
ist lawlessness with law, the rule by law, but in this over-
simplification-an over-simplification which closes the eyes to
the substance of social relations-many difficulties were con-
cealed. The American theory of law, developed out of precedent,
was not a suitable vehicle for German judges and lawyers
brought up in other traditions. On the other hand, adoption of
German legislation by repealing National Socialist laws and
restoring former enactments of the Weimar Republic would at
least be equal to sanctioning a dogmatical approach completely
alien to American jurists and therefore impossible to control;
under such conditions it would be difficult to ascertain whether
the Germans were really on the road to rule by law. Perhaps this
could be done with the help of the French who are closer to the
Germans by reason of common kinship to Roman law-except
that it is difficult to consider this idea seriously. On the other
hand it is not likely that a legal order can be created out of
a military occupation, which at best can only define the perimeter
of law, but cannot provide the inner substance of the law
itself.
Some indication of the scope of this problem (we emphasize
that the event is taking place during the war) was established
36. Campbell, supra note 5, at 146.
37. FRANKLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 264.38. All footnotes in the translation supplied by the translator.
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in the thesis of Fraenkel regarding the dualism of the Nazi
state.39 In 1941 this author published a work under the title of
the Dual State, in which he asserts that in National Socialist
Germany two systems were working: one rational, subordinated
to law, the other one operating according to personal and
party caprice.40 There was then the dual state in which co-
existed the prerogative state, capable of exercising unlimited
self-will and violence not hampered by any legal guarantees,
and the normative state governed according to law. This concept
was developed by Friedrich 1 who claimed that Germany pos-
sesses the idea of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) expressed in
the principle of equality before the law as voiced in the Weimar
Constitution. If, says Friedrich, that observation that these two
systems co-exist is sound, it follows that the destruction of the
Nazi sector (acting according to personal or party whims)
will automatically revive the other, giving the latter (acting
in accordance with faithful adherence to the law) opportunity
to fill the vacuum created by the disappearance of the party. In
other words, according to Friedrich, in Nazi Germany life was
regulated in part according to acceptable legal principles, so that
the only concern is to exclude National Socialist legal theory,
whereupon law will embrace the entire social process. Germany
will again be ruled by law, and after all, law is "at the very
core of what we are fighting for."42
On the same subject Mitchell Franklin wrote his work,-also
during the war. It is worthy of consideration in some detail
since it throws a curious light upon National Socialist legal
theory which contradicts absolutely the first mentioned writers.
The work of Professor Franklin is also worthy of attention
by reason of the fact that it appeared in 1947 (although as
indicated in the text, written during the war) and was included
among thirty-seven treatises by such eminent legal scholars and
sociologists as Goodhart, Kelsen, Kocourek, Sorokin, Lord
Wright, del Vecchio, etc., in a large and impressive volume
published on the occasion of Roscoe Pound's seventy-fifth birth-
39. FRAENKEL, THE DuAL STATE (1941).
40. Id. at 3-103; see also FRAENKEL, MILITARY OCCUPATION AND THE
RULE OF LAW (1944).
41. Friedrich, Military Government as a Step Toward Self-Rule, 7 THE
PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 527 (1943).
42. Id. at 537.
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day.43  One more detail provokes interest in M. Franklin's
treatise. It is supplied with a note by the editor that "the ideas
developed in this essay state the personal theory of the writer,
and in no way reflect official thinking.""14 Let us see what is in
Professor Franklin's work that might not reflect official thinking.
Peace may be the continuation of war by other means. The
military defeat of National Socialist armies, says Franklin, may
not mean that German fascism, Prussian reaction, or German
nationalism will cease their struggle. National Socialism should
be expected to fight for National Socialist ideology even after
German weapons have been surrendered, provided that German
surrender can thus be converted into a National Socialist
weapon. Certainly, National Socialist legal theory is flexible
and dynamic enough to adapt itself to new conditions. Indeed,
because certain National Socialist legal theory purported to
negate the German state, this ideology may remain a force
even after the German state is occupied.45 According to Frank,
Hoehn, Schmitt and other National Socialist theorists, the Ger-
man state gives way to the Volksgemeinschaft.
One of the slogans of National Socialism was the destruction
of the Weimar legal system. Nevertheless a considerable portion
thereof was necessarily retained. Would this mean that the
criminal code and the civil code were not National Socialist even
if we omit changes introduced into this legal system? Without
even changing the text of the statutes, National Socialism was
able to turn their meaning with the help of theory, by the
(traditional) methods of applying the law, interpretation and
the (usual techniques for) closing of gaps.4 6
The text of the adopted statute, said Hoehn, is merely the
undifferentiated source of law.4 7 The foundation of the inter-
pretation of law is the National Socialist Weltanschauung ex-
pressed in the party program and in the utterances of the
Fuhrer. National Socialist theorists have distinguished between
43. FRANKLIN, op. cit. supra note 1.
44. Id. at 262. Mr. Andrejew is laboring under a misconception by
attaching more importance to the note than it merits. It is a matter of com-
mon knowledge that personal views of government employees never receive
the official imprimatur.
45. Id. at 262-263.
46. The words in brackets seem to be clearly implied by Andrejew's text,
although not expressed. J.C.
47. HOEHN u.a. LEITSALTZE UEBER STELLUNG UND AUFGABEN DES
RICHTERS (1936). See also FRANKLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 268-269.
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new texts (decisions of the Fuhrer expressed in the form of
legislation or of decrees), which the judges had no power to
examine, and the Weimar legislation which was subordinated
to National Socialist Weltanschauung for "the healthy feeling"
and the purpose of the law. According to National Socialists,
interpretation should be guided not by the norm, but by the
purpose of the law. (Formulated) 48 law could only authorize, but
not rule. The groundwork for the legal system of National
Socialism was laid by the German legal theorists who preceded
it. Slogans of Interessenjurisprudenz, refuge in general clauses
(Flucht in die Generalklauseln), schools of free-law and others
-these are the points of contact between National Socialism
and German Nationalism in the realm of law.
There are no Weimar texts, says Franklin, but merely the
show of Weimar texts. There are no Weimar codes, but only
sources of codes. The Weimar legal precepts, which the oc-
cupants regard as the law, are in truth subordinated to the
received ideals of National Socialism. These precepts have a
content which the Anglo-American jurist does not appreciate.4
The conclusions are formulated in the author's words:
The military occupation of Germany should be an abso-
lute occupation. The legal system must be occupied. The
rule of law and the theory of the independence of the Ger-
man jurist must be rejected. There must be 'intellectual'
or ideological control of the German jurist. National So-
cialist legal theory must be extinguished. The theory of
'automatic' German return to legality must be abandoned.
The occupying armies must bend hostile jurists to their
will, or bend to the will of hostile jurists. There is a science
of veering the skill of the enemy technician against the
enemy, and it should be mastered. The occupants should
enjoy French skill in Roman law, and Soviet skill in sensing
fascist ideological movement and development. The session
of this school for Germany should endure until Germany
understands and accepts Hegel's instruction: 'What German
patriotism aims at should be reasonable.' 0
Franklin's thesis has a polemic character. This relieves him to
a certain extent of spelling out what the occupation authorities
will teach in "this school for Germany," what kind of German
48. Here again the word seems clearly to be implied by Andrejew's text.
49. These are substantially the words which Franklin uses in his essay.
See FRANKLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 274.
50. Id. at 278-279.
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socio-political framework might be "reasonable." 'The entire
argument of the author comes down to this, that the Weimar
legal system cannot be restored because of the universal ideology
of German jurists which negates the traditional rule by law.
He reproaches Fraenkel and Friedrich for their unhistorical
and mechanistic conception of the law. In spite of Franklin's
historical profundity and genuineness the author is guilty of
non-recognition of a significant factor. He omits any considera-
tion of the immutable nature of the impact of National So-
cialism, which may create the impression that it is simple col-
lective madness.51 But it isn't here that the reason for the
appended editor's note is to be found.52 [Here the translation
ends.]
IV.
Difficulties of exact translation in a field of abstract concep-
tions always appear.
The next to the last sentence in the above essay by Andrejew
translated literally reads as follows:
He omits entirely the accelerated power of National So-
cialism which may create the impression that National
Socialism is sheer collective madness.
Therefore he seems to feel that Franklin's solution is imprac-
tical because the latter fails to take into account an assumed con-
tinuing conviction on the part of German jurists that the phi-
losophy of National Socialism is a dynamic force which cannot
be extrapolated from the total German social process.
If the translator has interpreted Andrejew's criticism of
Franklin correctly, it seems that Andrejew has fallen into error
by assuming the omission of that which is the very root of
Franklin's thesis, namely, the persistence of National Socialist
philosophy despite military defeat.
It is unfortunate that the entire criticism of the Franklin essay
is concentrated in one sentence from which possibly different
inferences may be drawn. The one suggested by the translator
seems to him to be the most reasonable in the light of the words
actually used in the text.
In view of the fact that Andrejew believes that the Franklin
solution does not take into account the assumed continuing vigor
51. (But which is something a good deal more than that. Translator's
interpolation.)
52. Andrejew is facetious in searching for a motif. See note 44 supra.
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of the National Socialist ideology, it is interesting to speculate
about the kind of solution which Andrejew himself might
suggest. Perhaps he would regard the solution worked out in
East Germany as the ideal one.
In the meantime it would not be amiss to examine, but not
within the four corners of this article, the policies pursued in
this respect by the Occupation Administration of West Ger-
many.53 Only the passage of a great deal of time can determine
the validity of any of the theses suggested.
53. It would appear, however, that only the Fraenkel and Friedrich
proposals have been followed. See notes 39 and 41 supra.
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